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HOW THE WORLD PERCEIVED IT
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Abstract
State. capture. has. emerged. as. a. global. threat. in. several. countries.. The.definitions vary from the act of rent-seeking to  corruption. Russia, Ukraine, 
and.some.countries.in.Central.Asia.are.several.areas..where.state.capture.was first observed. )ndonesia is not immune from the threat. Several 
misconducts. in. the. country. had. already. been. labeled. as. state. capture..
There. are. some. distinctions. between. state. capture. and. corruption,.
whereas. in.a. few.countries.both.are.considered.as.the.same..Strategies.
for.combating.corruption.usually.involve.reducing.state.capture..
Introduction 
In.common.understanding,.corruption.is.often.referred.to.either.as.bribery.
practice.or.as.major.embezzlement/plundering.of.public.monies..There.is.also.a.
third.form.of.corruption,.less.known.but.still.very.pervasive,.found.often.but.not.
exclusively.in.transition.countries:.state.capture..
State. capture. has. evolved. from. being. contested. as. the. lead. factor. in.
corruption. in. the. Former. Soviet.Union. in. its. early. days. of. the. discussion,. to.
increasingly.being.re-examined.with.more.scepticism.as.to.its.actual.prevalence.
and.its.status.as.the.leading.type.of.corruption.in.the.region.
ͷ.	 DefinitionsWhen we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind 
a. bureaucrat. extorting. bribes. from. powerless. individuals. and. defenceless.firms simply to enable them to ǲget things done.ǳ Behind this view lies an 
understanding.of.the.state.extracting.rents.from.the.economy.for.the.exclusive.benefit of politicians and bureaucrats.
Joel. Hellman. and. Daniel. Kaufmann. (2001). said. that. in. transition.
economies,.corruption.has.taken.on.a.new.image—that.of.so-called.oligarchs.
manipulating.policy.formation.and.even.shaping.the.emerging.rules.of.the.game.
to.their.own.very.substantial.advantage..They.refer.to.this.behaviour.as.state 
capture.2..ǮState captureǯ was also defined by Vesna Pesic ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ as any group or social strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over state 
institutions. and. policies. for. its. own. interests. and. against. the. public. good.3.
1.The.author.currently.works.in.the.Directorate.of.Intellectual.Property.Rights,.Ministry.of.Justice.
and.Human.Rights,. Republic. of. Indonesia.. The. author.welcomes. all. comments. at. lily_eve2001@yahoo.
com.
2. Joel. Hellman. and. Daniel. Kaufmann. (2001).. Confronting. the. Challenge. of. State. Capture. in.
Transition.Economies,.Finance.&.Development..Volume.38.Number.3.from.http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm
3 Vesna Pesic ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ. State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia. CEPS Working Document 
No..262/March.2007.from.http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1309
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Teten.Masduki,.one.of.the.major.players.for.combating.corruption.in.Indonesia.
also.has.a.similar.view.that.state.capture.is.a.policy..made.to.the.advantage.of.
entrepreneurs.4..
Anne. Lugon-Moulin. (2010). in. understanding. state. capture. said. that. it.
occurs.when.the.ruling.elite.and/or.powerful.businessmen.manipulate.policy.formation and influence the emerging rules of the game ȋincluding laws and 
economic.regulations).to.their.own.advantage.5..
In.recognising.the.problem.of.state.capture,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.put.their efort on the complex interactions between firms and the state. Particularly, they emphasized the importance of mechanisms through which firms seek to shape decisions taken by the state to gain specific advantages, often through the 
imposition.of.anticompetitive.barriers.that.generate.highly.concentrated.gains.to.selected powerful firms at a significant social cost. Because such firms use their influence to block any policy reforms that might eliminate these advantages, 
state.capture.has.become.not.merely.a.symptom.but.also.a.fundamental.cause.
of.poor.governance.6.
The.dangers. to. the. long-term.development.of. such.a. capture.economy.
are.self-evident..New,.dynamic.entrepreneurs.have.strong.incentives.to.invest.
their. talents. in. capturing. the. state. rather. than. in. developing. innovative.
products.or.production.methods,.in.order.to.compete.successfully.in.a.distorted.
environment..
In.a.way,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.said.that.the.capture.economy.rewards.connections over competence and influence over innovation; it is fuelled 
by. private. investments. in. politics. that. weaken. the. state. and. undermine. the.provision of basic public goods. At the same time, they also find that capture 
economy. systematically. deters. private. economic. investments,. both. foreign.
and.domestic,.and.creates.obstacles. to. the.entry.of. small-.and.medium-sized.
enterprises.(SMEs),.undermining.the.key.sources.of.sustainable.growth.7.
In.the.absence.of.access.to.government.decision.making.through.collective.representatives, firms are compelled to seek informal, one-on-one relationships with individual state officials to represent their interests. A number of key 
writings.on.the.topic.suggest.the.roots.of.state.capture.extend.from.partial.civil.
liberties,. lack. of. transparency,. competition,. and. insecurity. of. property. rights..The lack of transparency tends to go hand in hand with insufficient competition among firms and other constituencies to influence the stateǯs deliberative 
processes.. Fostering. competition. in. the. economy. and. in. the.marketplace. for.political influence is the main challenge in preventing and combating state 
capture.8.
2. Modes
There.are.several.modes.of.state.capture.present.in.every.country..Even.the definitions vary. The common understanding is that state capture and legal 
4.Lily.Evelina.Sitorus.(2009)..Release.and.Discharge.sebagai.Altenatif.Penyelesaian.Masalah..(Studi.
Banding.Kasus.Kebijakan.Penyelesaian.BLBI)..Tesis:.FISIP.UI.
5.Anne.Lugon-Moulin,.Understanding.State.Capture..Freedom.from.Fear.Magazine.from.http://www.
freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233:understanding-
state-capture&catid=49:issue-6&Itemid=161
6.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
7.Ibid.
8.Ibid.
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corruption are one and the same. While most types of corruption are directed 
toward.changing.how.existing.laws,.rules,.or.regulations.are.implemented.with.respect to the bribe payer, state capture refers to corrupt eforts to influence 
how.those.laws,.rules,.and.regulations.are.formed.9.
.
The.high-capture.group.includes.countries.regarded.as.partial.reformers.
in. both. political. and. economic. terms.. Although. they. have.made. progress. in.
liberalisation. and. privatisation,. they. have. been. much. slower. to. enact. the.
complementary.institutional.reforms.to.support.the.emergence.of.markets.
State.capture.can.be.distinguished.between.types.of.institutions.subject.
to.capture.(Legislative,.Executive,.Judiciary,.regulatory.agencies,.or.public.works.
ministries). and. the. types. of. actors. actively. seeking. to. capture. (large. private.firms, political leaders, high ranking officials, or interest groupsȌ.10.
Concentration.of.both.economic.and.political.power.is.also.likely.to.lead.to.
serious.state.capture,.which.usually.goes.hand.in.hand.with.a.weak.civil.society,.
according. to. Helmann. and. Kaufmann.. Bribes. to. parliamentarians. to. “buy”.their votes on important pieces of legislation, bribes to government officials to enact favourable regulations or decrees, and bribes to judges to influence court 
decisions—these.are.the.classic.examples.of.grand.corruption.through.which.firms can encode advantages for themselves into the basic legal and regulatory 
structure.of.the.economy.
In.most.transition.economies,. the.mechanisms.through.which.the.state.
deliberates.on.the.formation.of.laws,.rules,.and.decrees.are.still.largely.hidden.
from. public. view.. The. use. of. public. hearings. and. the. Internet. to. provide. a.
transparent. forum. for. open. decision. making. is. rare.. Draft. laws. are. seldom.
published.for.discussion..Transcripts.of.deliberations.are.not.available.for.public.
perusal..The.voting.records.of.individual.legislators.are.not.made.available.to.
the.public..
9.Ibid.
10.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.
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At.the.same.time,.the.institutional.tools.that.various.constituencies.can.
use.to.gain.access.to.the.state’s.deliberations.are.very.limited..Political.parties.
are.weak..Trade.associations,.interest.groups,.and.collective.organisations.lack.the resources and experience to influence policy.11.
Due.to.the.fact,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.saw.few.transition.countries.have.sufficient safeguards to ensure proper disclosure of eforts to influence public officials, creating an environment highly susceptible to capture. Firms have little incentive to report their political contributions, and public officials face few or 
no.real.sanctions.for.accepting.such.contributions..
In.that.matter,.periodic.public.declarations.of.assets.and.income.sources.by government officials ȋand at times by their dependentsȌ are now required 
in. many. transition. countries,. but. the. relevant. implementation. mechanisms.remain quite weak. Conflict-of-interest rules are poorly understood and barely 
enforced..Public. interest.watchdog.groups.have. little. capacity. to.monitor. the.flow of funds from firms to politicians.
Case.to.the.point.in.Indonesia,.even.if.the.Ministry.of.Communication.and.
Information.had.already.released.the.proper.legislation.for.public.transparency,12.the implementation of it is hard to reach. When the mark up of police account 
happens,.the.party.concerned.based.in.this.law.asks.for.police.transparency.but.
it.is.usually.rejected.13.
Helmann. and. Kaufmann. research. found. that. in. the. capture. economy,.political influence is monopolised by powerful firms at diferent levels of 
government,.with.minimal.checks.and.balances.exerted.by.collective.interests..
In. several. transition. countries,. the. monopolisation. of. political. channels. of.influence reflects the underlying structure of the economy—in particular where 
the.high.concentration.of.natural.resources.in.national.output.creates.a.highly.unequal distribution of power across diferent firms and diferent sectors.
In. other. countries,.such monopolisation reflects 
continued. restrictions. on. the.
extent. of. political. competition..
The. state-capture. index. is.
systematically.lower.in.countries.
that. have. pursued. more.
comprehensive.economic.reform..
Furthermore,. at. any. given. pace.
of. economic. reform,. there. is. a.
dramatic.decline.in.state.capture.
in.countries.with.higher.levels.of.
civil. liberties..Yet,. it. is.clear. that.
the.causal.links.between.capture.
and.reform.run.in.both.directions,.
which.makes.breaking.out.of.the.vicious circle so difficult.14.
11.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
12.UU.No.14.Tahun.2008.(Law.Number.14.Year.2008).
13 )CW Ajukan Sengketa )nformasi soal Rekening Gendut Pati Polri ȋ)CW asked for police account 
transparency). from. http://antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=content/18862/icw-ajukan-sengketa-
informasi-soal-rekening-gendut-pati-polri
14.Hellmann.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
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 Anne Lugon-Moulin presented as example how captor firms can receive 
extra.advantages.not.only.in.the.form.of.sales.increases,.but.also.in.the.provision.
of.public.goods,.such.as.property.rights,.by.purchasing.individualised.protection.
of.their.property.rights.from.the.state.15.(owever, that comes at a significant social cost: if politicians and 
bureaucrats.can.minimise. their.political. risks.by.selling.privately.such.public.goods to a few individual firms in exchange of economic revenues, they have 
little.incentive.to.provide.the.public.at.large.with.open.access.to.these.goods..
Therefore,. the. level. of. insecurity. of. property. rights. is. much. higher. for. the.average firm and the ordinary citizen. Specific examples are state-owned 
enterprises.sold.at.low.prices.to.politicians.and.new.laws.designed.in.a.way.of.favouring specific economic actors in a given sector at the expense of free and 
fair.competition.for.all.16.
Practices The practices of state capture had invoked the party involved to find the 
solutions.. Kaufmann. is. one. of. the. leading. researchers. in. these. matters.. His.research basically made the basic ground for other researches to be held. World 
Bank. and. the. European. Bank. for. Reconstruction. and. Development. (EBRD).
conducted. joint. initiative. to. form. The. Business. Environment. and. Enterprise.
Performance.Survey.(BEEPS).17.
The.results.of.the.survey.in.2002.showed.that.there.has.been.a.decline.in.state.capture--significant in some cases--across the transition countries. The countries 
where.capture.was.most.pronounced--Russia,.Ukraine,.Azerbaijan,.and.Moldova--
have.seen.the.sharpest.decline,.while.countries.with.more.modest.capture.levels,.
for.example.in.some.south-eastern.European.countries,.have.remained.more.or.
less.constant.or.have.experienced.an.increase.in.levels.of.capture.18.
. Russia9 
Practitioners.in.Russia.consistently.highlight..two.parallel.processes.taking.
place.in.the.country:.state.capture.and.business.capture.(the.latter.being.used.to describe the state unlawfully taking control and exercising undue influence 
over.businesses);.or.even,.as.described.by.some,.these.two.processes.have.been.
turned.into.the.fusion.of.state.+.business.by.the.elite,.with.former.bureaucrats.running businesses and business leaders holding or controlling political office. 
Amongst.the.key.measures.to.address.the.situation.are.the.introduction.of.conflict of interest regulations, codes of conduct, and wide-ranging transparency 
reforms..In.addition,.it.has.now.been.acknowledged.by.many.that.to.galvanise.
Russia’s.public.debate.over.corruption,.it.is.vital.to.remove.the.sole.responsibility.
for. reform. from. the. government.. By. focusing. on. the. supply-side,. debate. can.
lead.to.more.direct,.immediate.and.measurable.action,.particularly.in.areas.like.
state.capture..Thus,.the.importance.of.engaging.the.business.community.in.the.
process.is.being.increasingly.highlighted..
15.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.
16.Ibid.
17.http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml
18. Donals. Bowser.. . Addressing. State. Capture. in. Russia/Ukraine/Central. Asia.. Anti-Corruption.
Resource.Center.from.http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query18.cfm
19.Ibid.
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a. Engaging The Business Community: Collective Action, Business Self-Regulation, 
Etc. 
Earlier. this. year,. Russian. President. Vladimir. Putin. publicly. challenged.
the. leaders. of. the. Union. of. Industrialists. and. Entrepreneurs. (RSPP). to. help.
“destroy. the.breeding.ground. for. corruption.”.RSPP. is. a.business. association.that includes the financial-industrial groups that secured control of a majority 
of.the.country’s.wealth.during.the.past.decade.of.privatisation..The.association.
responded. by. creating. a.working. group. that.will. recommend. administrative.
reform.measures.to.the.president,.which.will.include.reducing.obstacles.to.any.
business.that.provides.the.opportunity.and.incentive.to.engage.in.various.forms.
of.corruption,.including.state.capture.
Notwithstanding. the. fact. that. civil. servants. play. a. role. in. both. state.
and. business. capture,. the. breeding. ground. can. be. attacked. only. if. private.
sector.leaders.take.initiative..There.are.numerous.market.incentives.for.RSPP.
and.other.business. leaders. to. adopt. anti-corruption.practices..Those. include.
enhancing.reputation.and.good.will.as.business.assets,. reducing.the.risk.and.
costs. associated.with. capture,. strengthening. competitive. position,. increasing.
shareholder.value,.and.gaining.access.to.capital.and.credit.on.better.terms..In.
the. long-term,.RSPP. requires. institutions. that. can. govern. a.market. economy.
built.on.true.competition..To.meet.Putin’s.challenge,.RSPP.should.take.concrete.
initiatives. that. can. be. implemented. largely. by. the. supply. side.. In. particular,.
RSPP.members.should.form.“integrity.pacts”.with.other.large.businesses,.SMEs,.
and.non-governmental.organisations.(NGOs).at.the.national.and.regional.levels.
designed.to.institute.conditions.for.transparent.and.fair.business.competition..
The.most.concrete.form.of.an.integrity.pact.is.a.“no-bribery.pledge,”.under.
which. companies. entering. a. government. tender. or. privatisation. bid. and. the.officials responsible for choosing the winner commit to a transparent procedure. )n particular, they pledge not to ofer, pay, accept, or seek bribes of any kind 
during.the.tender..To.show.their.good.faith,.they.may.place.funds.in.escrow.that.
they.would.relinquish.if.they.did.engage.in.bribery..If.a.business.does.not.abide.
by.the.guidelines,. it.will. lose.the.bid.and.other.participants.in.the.pledge.can.
stop.doing.business.with.(or.blacklist).it..Such.pacts.have.been.implemented.to.
one.degree.or.another.throughout.the.world..To.maximise.impact.on.economic.
growth,.RSPP.should.form.integrity.pacts.that.help.both.large.enterprises.and.
SMEs..
RSPP. leaders. should. also. take. initiative. in. regions.where. they. operate.
their.factories.and.other.outlets..They.are.in.the.best.position.to.help.institute.
local. programmes. to. monitor. government. agencies. and. budget. processes,.
increase. access. to. information. regarding. allocation. of. public. resources,. and.
foster. independent. oversight. of. public. procurement.. These. are. best. done.
through.joint.coalitions.with.NGOs.and.watchdogs.
.RSPP.is.not.the.only.institution.engaging.in.the.process.of.private.sector-
driven. initiatives. to.address.corruption.and.state.capture..Disproportionately.injured by the extortion practices of officials at all levels, SMEs are already taking 
local.initiatives.throughout.Russia..Another.example.of.a.private.sector.initiative.
is. the. formation---by.a.highly.regarded.economics.professor,.Lev.Kaplan,.and.
the.General.Director.of.the.U.S..subsidiary.of.Otis.Elevator,.Vladimir.Marov--of.
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an. “Honest.Builders’. Club.”.The. coalition.dedicated. to. fair. business.practices.
now.includes.30.of.the.largest.local.construction.companies,.various.NGOs,.and.
the.city’s.Vice-Governor.for.Construction.
The.Association.of.Minority.Shareholders’.Rights.assisted.the.Kremlin’s.eforts to expose shady financial deals at Gazprom, ͵ ͺ percent of which is owned 
by.the.state..Minority.shareholders.claimed.that.the.theft.of.vast.amounts.of.cash.had kept share prices low and reduced profits. )n December ʹͲͲͳ, Gazpromǯs new management decided to reclaim the Purgaz gas field, a valuable asset that 
was.previously.‘pawned.’.Since.the.new.management.arrived,.Gazprom.shares.
have.risen.44.percent..
The.Corporate.Behavioural.Code.is.one.example.of.Russia’s.determination.
to. improve.corporate.governance.and.the. investment.climate..More.than.150.
Russian. companies. were. consulted. in. the. course. of. developing. the. code.. It.
includes.amendments.to.the.joint.stock.company.law,.securities.market.law,.the.
criminal.law,.and.provisions.of.criminal.liability.in.cases.of.non-disclosure,.as.well as measures for enforcement. While some are skeptical as to the genuine 
intentions,. it. is.widely.expected.to.seal.major. loopholes. in.existing.corporate.
governance.structures..
b. Transparency Measures20
Among. recent. concrete. measures. and/or. developments. aimed. at.
improving.transparency.are:
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations
Russia. passed. a. law. on. the. election. of. deputies. to. the. State. Duma. in.November ʹͲͲʹ. While the basic provisions of the law remain the same as in the ͳͻͻͻ version, it contains some new provisions concerned with finance, namely 
the. introduction.of.spending.caps,. stricter.regulation.of. funding.sources,.and.
size. of. acceptable. donations.. A. law. on. the. presidential. election. was. passed.
in. December. 2002. with. the. intention. to. streamline. a. hitherto. complicated.
process..Party financing and regulations remain as major issues for Russia in the context of state capture. )nformal political actors--financial groups and political 
“oligarchs”--dominate.the.political.spectrum..Political.parties.are.included.into.
the. structure.of. an. “oligarchy”. to.act. as. legitimate.vehicle. for. engagement. in.
public.policy.and.lobbying..They.are.supported.by.their.own.controlled.mass.
media.and.key.industries.
On access to Information 
Russia’s.federal.access.to.information.law.has.not.yet.passed.the.stage.of.
parliamentary.debate.and.is.under.review.by.the.Duma.since.1996..Some.regions.
and. local. entities. (including. Kaliningrad,. Greater. Novgorod). have,. however,.
engaged. in. reform.with. the. goal. of.making. information. held. by. government.
bodies.available.to.the.general.public..Generally.speaking,.access.to.information.
is.not.considered.a.great.priority.by.politicians.and.the.civil.society.alike.in.a.
context.in.which.the.state.is.still. largely.perceived.to.be.a.ruler,.rather.than.a.
provider.of.public.services.20.Ibid.
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2. Ukraine
In. Ukraine,. the. dominant. motive. appears. to. be. revenge. against. the.oligarchs who supported the old regime. Big businessmen identified with the 
new.regime.may.also.have.their.own.motives. . in.seizing.the.assets.of.the.old.oligarchs. Again, a third goal is to level the playing field. Clearly, the two first 
objectives.contradict.the.third.one,.which.is.the.legitimate.goal..One.idea.is.that.
the.privatisation.will.be.annulled,.compensation.will.be.paid.to.the.prior.owner.
for.his.initial.payment,.and.then.the.enterprise.will.be.sold.anew.by.the.state.at.
a.competitive.auction..The.redistribution.of.property.is.often.considered.as.one.
of.the.characteristics.of.a.revolution.21.
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations22 
Ukraine.has.adopted.a.number.of.laws.to.regulate.this.area,.among.them.
the.2001.Law.on.Political.Parties,.the.1999.Presidential.Election.Law,.and.the.
2001.Parliamentary.Election.Law..The.latter.is.considered.to.be.an.improvement.
compared.to.the.previous.(1998/94).legislations.Ukraine has introduced some specific measures on public disclosure of political finances, such as for example, the information on the size and sources of contributions to the funds of candidates, as well as publication of financial 
statements. indicating. the.use. of. those. funds.. . The.CEC. (the. central. electoral.
body).has.to.publish.the.information.in.two.national.newspapers.within.seven.
days.prior.to.the..elections..
One. of. the. most. severe. problems. in. the. area. of. elections,. campaign.financing, and regulation that has direct impact on the dynamics of state capture 
is.still..the.issue.of.funding.sources.for.political.parties..Ukrainian.fragmented.
and. non-institutionalised. party. system. keeps. encouraging. big. businesses. to.
form.client.circles.and.run.their.own.parties.to.directly.control.decision-making.
processes.
In.terms.of.Civil.Society-led.concrete.initiatives.in.this.area,.Transparency.
International. (TI). national. chapter. (and. “Freedom. of. Choice. Coalition”).
had. implemented. a. project. on. Public. Monitoring. of. Parliamentary. Electoral.
Campaign.Financing.in.2002..
3. Central Asia23
State. capture. does. not. necessarily. remain. stable. over. time.. In. many.instances, eforts were focused at constructing well-functioning states early in 
the.transition.period.only.to.be..swamped.in.the.second.half.of.the.decade..For.
some.countries,.it.is.a.question.of.whether.they.will.progress.or.regress.in.the.
transition.to.democracy.and.to.a.market.economy..In.Central.Asia,.Kazakhstan.
is.one.of.the.examples..
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations
Kazakhstan. adopted. a. Law. on. Political. Parties. on. 26. June. 2002.. It.introduced fundamental changes to the financial activities of political parties, 
21.Anders.Aslund. (2005)..Comparative.Oligarchy:.Russia,.Ukraine.and. the.United.States..Center.
for. Social. and. Economic. Research. from. http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/4931074_
SA%20296last.pdf
22.Bowser..Loc..Cit.
23.Ibid.
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including. their. sources. of. funding.. Potential. transparency. and. accountability.
gains.are,.however,.contravened.by.the. inclusion.of.clauses. in. the. law.that. in.turn directly afects the formation and operation of political parties, e.g. the 
requirement.of.a.minimum.50,000-membership.for.a.party.to.register.and.the.
introduction. of. mechanisms. designed. to. enable. the. state. to. interfere. in. the.internal afairs of political parties. 
On Access to Information
In.Kazakhstan,.the.Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan.(adopted.in.
1995).guarantees.access.to.information.as.a.constitutional.right:.Everyone.shall.
have.the.right.to.freely.receive.and.disseminate.information.by.any.means.not.
prohibited.by.law..The.list.of.items.constituting.state.secrets.of.the.Republic.of.
Kazakhstan.shall.be.determined.by.the.law..The.subsequent.law,.however,.“on.
protection.of.state.secrets.of. the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan,”.which.“determines.
legal.principles.and.the.single.system.of.protection.of.state.secrets.in.all.types.of.
activity.of.state.executive.and.management.agencies,.enterprises,.institutions,.
associations,.and.organisations,.irrespective.of.the.form.of.property,.as.well.as.
of.military.units.and.citizens.of.the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan.on.the.territory.of.
the.state.and.outside.of.it,”.is.rather.extensive.
The.Kyrgyz.Republic.adopted.a.Law.on.the.Fight.against.Corruption.on.6.
March.2003..Other.than.establishing.the.legal.and.organisational.foundations.for.the fight against corruption in Kyrgyzstan, the law explicitly mentions the role of the media in investigating corruption ofences and disseminating information 
regarding.the. latter.. It.also.establishes.provisions.for.government.agencies.to.
publicise.information.relating.to.internal.corruption.matters..
On Conflicts of )nterest and DisclosureThe term ǲconflicts of interestǳ did for the first time become a provision 
of. Kazakhstan’s. law. on. control. over. execution. of. national. and. local. budgets.
enacted.in.2002..It.is.provided.for.as..any.activity.of.relations.which.is.capable.
of.limiting.the.objectivity.and.the.independence.of.the.state.body.employees.in.
terms.of.either.internal.or.external.control.
A.Kazakh.governmental.decree.of.2000.establishes.that.all.civil.servants.within a month of assuming office are obliged for the duration of their public service to transfer to confidential management any shares of participation in authorised capital of commercial organisations and other conflicting property and assets. Kyrgyzstan does not have any specific conflict of interest legislation, 
but.interestingly.it.is.regulated.as.an.aspect.of.corruption.by.the.standards.of.
the.Criminal.Code..
Finally,. an. interesting. governmental. body. is. under. discussion. for.
establishment.in.Kyrgyzstan-the.National.Council.on.Faithful.Management..Its.
main.tasks.are.inter.alia.to.include.taking.steps.to.eliminate.the.unwarranted.and.
needless.interference.of.the.state.structures.into.the.economy.and.commercial.
entities..
State Capture in Indonesia
Taking. the. role. as. Putin. already. had. is. Indonesian. President. Susilo.Bambang Yudhoyono. When elected as the sixth president of the country, he 
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introduced the integrity pact for his cabinet. Candidates for any ministry office 
must. sign. their. . commitment. to. avoid. corruption. according. to. the. code. of.
conduct.24.This.action.might.relate.to.the.history.of.Indonesia.under.the.Suharto.
regime.
. The. Suharto. government. may. have. never. intended. to. give. grief. to.
Indonesia,.but.alas.after.ruling.for.almost.32.years,.it.had.established.itself.as.
a.corrupt.regime..After.that,. Indonesia. forced.to.embark.on.a.comprehensive.
and.unprecedented.process.of.decentralisation,.devolving--almost.overnight--
enormous.responsibilities.to.regional,.provincial,.and.local.governments..In.spite.
of.considerable.achievements,.the.Indonesian.decentralisation.process.continues.
to.face.major.challenges.of.state.capture.by.the.local.elites,.a.deeply.entrenched.
patronage.system,.and.widespread.petty.and.bureaucratic.corruption..
The. greater. the. achievement,. the. greater. the. risk. involved.. The.
emergence. of. stronger. civil. society. and. a. free. media. constitute. promising.
trends.that.combined.with. further.reforms.aimed.at.promoting.transparency.
and. community. participation,. as. well. as. reinforcing. upward. and. downward.
accountability.mechanisms..It.could.ensure.that.decentralisation.fully.yields.the.intended benefits.
TI. in. accordance.with. Anti. Corruption. Resource. Centre25. tries. to. fully.
understand.the.nature.of.corruption.challenges.at.the.local.level..In.query,.they.
said. that. it. is. important. to. analyse. the. successes.and. failures.of. Indonesia’. s.
unprecedented. decentralisation. process,. that. transferred. rapidly. complete.
responsibility.for.most.public.services.to.the.sub.national.level..The.fast.transition.from a highly centralised to a largely decentralised system has created specific accountability challenges that significantly afect corruption risks at the local 
level..
ͷ.	 Definitions
Todung.Mulya.Lubis.(2009),.senior.advocate.practising.in.Indonesia,.said.
that.Lapindo’s.mud.case.in.Sidoarjo.is.an.example.of.state.capture.corruption..
An. activist. for. Transparency. International. Indonesia. (TII),. Lubis. surely.
knows.enough.about.corruption.practices..He.said. that. the.Lapindo.case. is.a.
manifestation.of.state.capture.corruption.
. Furthermore,. in. media26. he. explained. that. state. capture. corruption.happens if there are some parties that may gain benefits from government 
policy.. Indication.to.the.fact.can.be.seen.in.this.case.when.the.party. involved.
never.took.the.responsibility.for.the.disaster..The.policy.endorsed.by.Indonesian.government to take responsibility for Lapindo mud flow victims has illustrated 
how.businesses.may.shift.a.policy.against.public.interests. What makes state capture possible according to David Kupferschmidt 
(2010). from. International. IDEA. is. the. existence. of. a. well-organised. and. a.
well-funded. interest;. in. the. case.of. Indonesia,. the.powerful. business. groups..
Their. control. of. large.media. groups,. combined.with.weak. law. enforcement,.24.Calon.Menteri.harus.tanda.t ngani.komitmen.anti-korupsi.(2009)..Antaranews.com.f om.http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/1255836656/calon-menteri-tanda-tangan-anti-korupsi
25.Marie.Chene.(2009)..Corruption.Challenges.at.Sub-National.Level.in.Indonesia..Anti-Corruption.
Resources.Center.from.http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=210
26.Todung:.Kasus.Lapindo.adalah.“state.capture.corruption.(2009)..Antaranews.com.from.http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/1251382626/todung-kasus-lapindo-adalah-state-capture-corruption
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contributes.to.establishment.of.a.conducive.environment.to.state.capture.27.
. State. capture. can. be. described. as. “investment”. in. political. parties.through political financing or bribery in law enforcement agencies, combined with the utilisation of mass media to influence public opinion and policy making. )t allows powerful interest groups to use their abundant financial resources  to halt the opportunities for gaining economic, legal, and social benefits.28..
. Colombian.economist.Luis.Jorge.Garay,.under.the.concept.of.Co-opted.State Reconfiguration, asserted  that the action of legal and illegal organisations,
through illegitimate practices, seek to systematically modify from within the 
political regime and influence the formation, modification, interpretation, and 
application of the rules of the game and public policies. These practices are 
undertaken with the purpose of obtaining sustained benefits and ensuring that 
their interests are validated politically and legally, as well as gaining social 
legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow the founding 
principle of social welfare”.29.
. The.Corruption.Eradication.Commission.(KPK),.which.has.been.under.constant attack from the police, the attorney-general office, and parliament 
members.for.the.last.couple.of.years,.remains.as.one.of.the.last.rampant.against.
the.impunity.sought.by.state.capturers..The.Indonesian.political.party.system.
is.characterised.by.a.growing.individualisation.of.weak.leadership.and.by.the.
inability.of.political.parties.to.identify.the.champion.core.of.constituent.groups.
and.to.articulate.policy.programs.
. The reality of Indonesia’s politics is that liberalised elections are extremely 
costly for political parties. In a country with enormous and demographically 
heterogeneous characteristics, winning elections requires both securing access 
to financial resources, and strengthening the presence and visibility of political 
parties at the local level to mobilise voters. Incumbent leaders clearly have a 
competitive advantage on both fronts due to their influence on local budgets, their 
ability to help businesses with close ties to political parties, and their ability to use 
state resources to build strong support bases, particularly through the allocation 
of social funds to mass organisations.30  )n its press release, T)) concluded that the financing of local elections is 
the.root.of.political.corruption.and.state.capture.at.the.regional.level..Besides.
its.direct.impact.on.state.resources,.it.raises.more.fundamental.issues.related.to.
political.leadership,.the.strengthening.of.Indonesia’s.political.party.system,.and.
public.trust.towards.democracy.
. Soekarno,.the.Founding.Father.of.Indonesia.had.already.addressed.this.
issue.in.BPUPKI.on.1.June.1945,.“We are building a Nation for all. Not for one 
person, not for one class, not for aristocrats, nor for the rich, but for all.”. This.
cannot.happen.if.the.electoral.process.is.rigged.by.money.politics..One.of.the.
biggest.challenges.associated.with.decentralisation.is.the.risk.of.state.capture.
by.the.local.elite. With decentralisation, local elite and politicians suddenly gain access to regional resources they can divert to benefit influential groups and individuals whose money or votes count rather than the public at large. When 
27.Money.Politics.and.State.Capture. (2010)..Transparency. International. Indonesia. from.http://
www.ti.or.id/en/index.php/press-release/2010/11/11/money-politics-and-state-capture
28.Ibid.
29.Ibid.
30.Ibid.
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civil.participation.in.local.government.is.low,.as.it.seems.to.be.the.case.in.most.
Indonesian.provinces,31. there. is.a.greater.chance.of. interest.groups.and. local.
elite.capturing.and.directing.resources.towards.their.own.priorities.rather.than.
towards.poverty.alleviation.and.improved.service.delivery.
2. Modes
There.are.several.types.of.state.capture.in.Indonesia:.32
Local networks of Patronage 
Across.the.country,..the.various.powers.of.the.state.tend.to.be.concentrated.
in.the.village.elites.who.usually.maintain.close.and.personal.relations,.increasing.
the.risks.of.collusion.between.key.stakeholders.to.pursue.vested.interests..This.overlap of social and political functions and relations at the local level afects 
public-.and.private-sector.hiring.practices,.business.relationships,.and.awarding.
of.contracts.with.widespread.practices.of.nepotism.and.cronyism..
Red tape and bribe extortion 
High.level.of.bureaucracy.provides.multiple.opportunities.for.rent-seeking.at sub national level, with involved public officials having large discretionary powers as well as monopoly over these procedures. Bribes paid by firms  mostly 
arise. from. red. tape,. particularly. in. permits. and. licenses. imposed. by. local.government officials. Research indicated that red tape and bribe extortion tend 
to. decrease. in. better. funded. localities. and.with. increased. education. of. local.officials.33.
Lack of local capacity
Corruption. risks. are. further. increased. by. the. lack. of. capacity. of. local.
governments.to.manage.increased.responsibility.and.powers..Local.governments.
often.lack.the.human.and.material.resources.to.perform.government.duties.in.
a.transparent.and.accountable.manner.as.well.as.the.operational.and.economic.capacity to run competitive and efficient public services. 
Misuse of local public resources .)n many local regions, levels of local corruption strongly afect the efficiency 
of.public.spending.on.service.delivery.and.the.enactment.of.inconsistent.local.
regulations.governing.local.budgets.by.national.and.regional.parliaments..Those.can be magnified with the lack of local capacity to review budget documents 
and. to. monitor. budget. formulation. and. execution.. Such. have. opened. many.
opportunities.for.corruption.and.misuse.of.public.resources.34..
Public procurement
Local.procurement.is.another.area.especially.vulnerable.to.corruption.due.
to.the.persistent.culture.of.favours.and.patronage.at.the.local.level..As.a.result,.
31.Chene..Loc..Cit...
32.Ibid.
33.J..Vernon.Henderson.and.Ari.Kuncoro.(2004)..Corruption.in.Indonesia..Brown.University.from.
http://www.pstc.brown.edu/henderson-kuncoro.pdf
34. Daniel. Suryadarma. (2008).. Corruption,. Public. Spending,. and.Education.Outcomes:. Evidence.
from.Indonesia.Research.School.of.Social.Sciences.The.Australian.National.University.
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local procurement ofers many opportunities for corrupt practices, including 
collusion. of. suppliers,. bid-rigging,. bribes. and. kickbacks,. and. favouritism. in.
contracts’.awarding.
Facilitation and other informal payments
Informal. payments. remain. highly. pervasive. in. the. post. Suharto. era,.including payments to speed up the issuance of certificates, permits, and licenses 
or.to.access.public.services.that.are.supposed.to.be.free.of.charge..Cutting.across.
all.sectors.of.service.delivery,.there.are.also.opportunities.for.extorting.money.
for.so-called.“services”.such.as.school.or.hospital.admissions,.shoes.or.school.
uniforms. (that. are. sold.by. the. teachers),. private. tutoring,. or.bribes. for. good.
grades.
Lack of efficient controls and oversight mechanisms
In.the.urge.to.move.away.from.the.old.autocratic.regime,.reforms.failed.to establish efective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that can hold local 
governments.accountable.to.the.central.government..Currently.existing.public.mechanisms have not proven to be the most efective to uncover corruption cases in )ndonesia. A World Bank study of ͳͲ corruption cases in five )ndonesian 
provinces. shows. that. almost. without. exception,. all. corruption. cases. had.
been. uncovered. and. reported. by. NGOs,. community. groups,. social. activists,.individual villagers, or afected parties rather than oversight, audit, or justice 
institutions.35
Culture of impunity
Indonesia’s. long. tradition. of. authoritarian. rule. has. left. a. legacy. of.
impunity.for.perpetrators.of.corruption,.which.combined.with.weak.protection.
of. whistleblowers;. This. provides. fertile. ground. for. rent-seeking. behaviours..
Sanctions.have.been. rarely. enforced,.which. tends. to.make. corruption. a. low-cost and high-benefit activity, with little likelihood of redress. The traditional 
hierarchical.structure.of.local..villages.also.limits.the.propensity.of.citizens.to.
question.those.in.power..In.addition,.at.the.village.level,.citizens.appear.to.have.
little.awareness.of. their.rights.and.entitlements,.as.well.as.of. legal.processes.
and.resources.36.
.
Lesson Learned
Corruption. is. a. political. problem. that. will. require. strong. political.
commitment..It.cannot.be.solely.resolved.with.institutional.reform..Additional.eforts and resources should be directed to strengthen political accountability. 
Thus,. by. empowering. civil. society. and. constituency. groups. to. demand.accountability, we can earn a public policy that does not benefit  vested interests 
at.the.expense.of.public.interests.and.people’s.welfare.
35 Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo and Dewi Damayanti ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ. Fighting Corruption in Decentralized 
Indonesia.Case.Studies.on.Handling.Local.Government.Corruption.from..http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/corruption_exec_sum_en.pdf..
36 Andrea Woodhouse ȋʹͲͲͷȌ. Village Corruption in )ndonesia Fighting Corruption in )ndonesiaǯs 
Kecamatan.Development.Program..Indonesian.Social.Development.Paper.No..6.
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The. international. development. community. has. an. important. role. in.
supporting.the.development.of.a.strong.and.critical.civil.society..Many.countries.
began.transition.as.weak.states.unable.to.provide.basic.public.goods.and.with.sets of powerful incumbent firms ȋthese were predominantly state owned and 
newly.privatised).dominating.their.respective.markets.without.having.to.resort.
to.bribery.payments..
To.compete.in.such.an.environment,.new.entrants.adopted.a.strategy.of.state capture to buy greater security for their property rights from public officials 
and.to.encode,.or.incorporate,.competitive.advantages.into.the.emerging.legal.and.regulatory framework. Thus, state capture  became a strategy for a few firms to 
create. zones. of. relative.
security. and. advantage.
for. themselves. at. the.
expense. of. all. other.firms. 
In. high-capture.economies, captor firms 
grow. more. than. twice.as fast as other firms. )n 
sharp. contrast,. captor.firms appear to enjoy 
few. advantages. in. low-
capture. economies,.
where. such. grand.
corruption. looks. more.
like. a. survival. strategy.
for. poorly. performing.firms.37.
.
Transparent. governance. reforms. are. therefore. highly.needed. to. better.
share. the. power. in. the. society,. both. horizontally. and. vertically,. and. to. put.in place very clear conflict of interests rules. State institutions should have safeguards to prevent them from being ǲownedǳ by specific individuals enjoying 
a.high.discretionary.power.38..
On.the.other.hand,.a.vocal.civil.society,.provided.that.basic.civil.liberties.are ensured, will point at governance deficiencies, call for better accountability, 
and.responsiveness.from.the.side.of.the.government..New.incentives.ought.to.
be.found..to.possibly.instil.a.behaviour.change.in.those.actors.
International.pressure.or.reward.(such.as. joining.the.European.Union).
can.be.a.very.powerful.tool,.as.demonstrated.in.the.case.of.the.new.EU.member.
states,. which. have. undertaken. major. and. rapid. endeavours. in. the. realm. of.
governance..to.reach.the.goal.of.entering.the.EU.39.The eforts of firms to influence the legal, policy, and regulatory 
environment. wherein. . they. operate. constitute. a. normal. and. indeed. healthy.process that is common to all countries. What distinguishes such interactions in the capture economy is exclusion. Some firms enjoy exclusive privileges 
37.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
38.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.
39.Ibid.
 No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011    INDONESIA Law Review
~.161.~
to influence decisions of the state while others are systematically excluded, enabling state officials to make choices that concentrate benefits on those with 
access.at.a.high.cost.to.those.who.are.excluded..
Although. the. general. remedies. for. such. problems—transparency. and.competition—are, by now, increasingly acknowledged, the specific ways in which 
reform.of.state.capture.can.be.achieved.are.less.obvious..Mobilising.the.losers.
in.the.capture.economy—small.and.medium-sized.enterprises,.consumers,.and.
other.interest.groups—and.enhancing.their.collective.voice.to.counterbalance.the captors can have a catalytic efect in weakening the foundation of the capture 
economy.40.
An. important. reform. instrument. that. is. increasingly.used.by. the.more.
competitive. sectors,. the. disenfranchised,. non-governmental. organisations,.
and.others.working.to.combat.state.capture.is.the.power.of.data..Furthermore,.
policies.that.encourage.market.entry,.which.might.be.overlooked.by.the.existing.
captors,.are.particularly.important..Over.time,.more.and.more.“smaller.oligarchs”.may emerge to compete for influence and dissipate the rents for state capture.
1. Corruption As Crime
“The cartels have not yet corrupted the government’s senior levels, but 
sooner or later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be 
a saint to reject them.”41.Since.time,.both.legitimate.and.illegitimate.businesses.
have.been.attempting.to.distort.or.displace.the.state.for.its.own.gain..In.many.
contexts,. organised. criminal. groups. have. become.major. contenders. in. these.eforts, engaging significantly at the intellectual, political, and institutional level 
with.state.and.social.actors..
Until.recently,.organised.criminal.activity.was.constrained.within.a.state’s.borders or limited to a small number of global cartels and mafia groups. (owever, 
the.end.of.Communism.coupled.with.the.expansion.of.global.markets.and.the.
rising.sophistication.of.information.communications.technology.have.spurred.
mass.expansion.of.organised.crime.
In. the. course. of. expanding. their. operations,. transnational. organised.
crime.groups.and.networks.have.sought.to.gradually.weaken,.co-opt,.disable,.
privatise,.or.usurp.the.functions.of.governmental.agencies,.political.and.judicial.
institutions,.and.the.state.itself..In.contrast.to.other.illicit.means.of.interaction.with the state such as Ǯinfluenceǯ or Ǯadministrative corruption,ǯ organised 
criminal.groups.often.seek.to.“prevent.the.law.from.being.enforced.altogether”.
leading.to,.or.further.ensconcing.a.culture.of.impunity..)n many states across the globe, politicians and public officials are perceived 
(and.have.often.been.found.to.be).as.part.of.illicit,.elite,.and.corrupt.networks..
Over.time,.this.has.resulted.in.increasing.public.mistrust.of.parliamentarians,.
public. servants,. and. state. institutions,. often. leading. to. a.waning. respect. for.
authority.and.the.rule.of.law,.and.decreased.institutional.legitimacy.
Despite.the.vast.body.of.literature.on.these.issues.and.the.huge.sums.of.
money. invested. in. developing. policy. and. operational. responses. to.meet. the.
challenges. that. organised. criminals. and. corrupt. politicians. and. other. state.actors pose, significant challenges remain.
40.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
41.Center.on. International.Cooperation.(2011)..Seminar.on.Organized.Crime.and.State.Capture,.
Meeting.Report..New.York.University.from.http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/Lima%20Semin
ar%20Background%20Paper.pdf
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During. the. 1990s,. law. enforcement. agencies. in. Europe. developed. a.number of operational definitions of the phrase ǲorganised criminal group.ǳ Those definitions agree on the following crucial elements: such a group is structured, has some permanence, commits serious crimes for profit, uses violence, has corrupt officials, launders criminal proceeds, and reinvests in the 
licit.economy.42.While state capture is often practiced by private actors, it also can be 
practiced.by.people.within.the.government,. in.alliance.with.private.actors.or.not. )llicit political finance facilitates corruption and other means of efectively 
privatising.–.through.bribes,.intimidation,.and.violence.–.vital.state.functions,.
federal. and. local. agencies,. members. of. parliament,. political. parties,. key.
government.actors,.local.governments,.and.state.territory.43.
State. capture. aims. at. systematically. distorting. or. displacing. the. state.through a clandestine parallel entity or entities, and may be classified as the 
most. pernicious.manifestation. of. political. corruption.. State. capture. is. to. be.
distinguished. from. petty. corruption;. it. is.manifested. as.meta-corruption,. or.grand corruption, in which illicit political finance is used to systematically 
control.public.institutions.While the phenomenon of state capture also takes place within non-
democratic.governments,.it.can.be.argued.that,.except.in.rare.cases,.non-democratic.
governments. are. examples. of. comprehensive. state. capture,.whether. by. clans,.
organised. crime. networks,. armies,. militias,. liberation. movements,. oligarchs,.
multinational.corporations,.foreign.governments,.or.a.combination.thereof.
Crime.and.corruption.do.not.always.co-exist,.share.the.same.determinants,.
or.respond.to.the.same.strategies.and.measures..A.corrupt.and.authoritarian.
police.state.can.control.common.crime,.as.in.North.Korea..Conversely,.common.
crime. can.be. a. challenge. to. countries.with. satisfactory. anti-corruption. track.
records,.like.Chile.44.
Crime. rates. tend. to. be. higher. where. there. is. high. unemployment,.
high. socio-economic. inequality,. and. lax. gun. laws.. Corruption. thrives. where.
civil. liberties,. free. press,. transparency,. and. contestable. politics. are. absent..
Functioning.rule-of-law.matters.for.controlling.both.crime.and.corruption;.but.again diferences emerge: an independent judiciary is crucial for combating political corruption and an efective police is important for fighting petty 
corruption.as.well.as.common.crime..There are also diferences between the determinants of common  and 
organised. crime,. since. the. latter. does. relate. to. corruption.more. closely—for.instance, drug traffickers and underground arms dealers thrive in collusion 
with.corrupt.authorities.in.weak.states..Unfortunately,.most.of.the.research.on.corruption focuses on developing countries. When corruption indices measure 
cruder.forms.of.corruption,.such.as.bribery,.they.mask.one.of.the.most.serious.
governance.challenges.facing.countries.like.the.United.States.today—so-called.
legal.corruption.and.state.capture.by.powerful.corporations.
42. Edgardo. Buscaglia. and. Jan. van. Dijk. (2003).. Controlling. Organized. Crime. and. Corruption. in.
the.Public.Sector..Forum.on.Crime.and.Society.Vol.3.No..1.and.2.from.http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
forum/forum3_Art1.pdf
43.David.Kupferschmidt.(2009)..Illicit.Political.Finance.and.State.Capture..International.IDEA.from.
http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/IDEA_Inlaga_low.pdf
44.Daniel.Kaufmann.(2010),.Breaking.the.Cycle.of.Crime.and.Corruption?.Brookings.from.http://
www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0414_corruption_crime_kaufmann.aspx
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The strategies to combat diferent manifestations of crime and corruption will difer from each other, and must be tailored to country context. To combat 
common.crime,.it.is.important.to.focus.on.shared.socio-economic.progress.and.reduced unemployment among the youth, police efectiveness, and efectivegun 
banamong.civilians..To.address.legal.corruption.and.state.capture,.reforms.in.transparency, as well as restrictions on corporate political finance and lobbying 
is.needed..
Yet.crime.and.corruption.do.share.important.aspects.in.common..To.be.
prepared. to. take. on.powerful. vested. interests. and. to. address. the. challenges.
of. money. in. politics,. political. will,. leadership,. and. integrity. are. required. at.the top. Some examples of strategic uses of illicit political finance used toward 
state.capture.are.cursorily.outlined.in.the.following,.as.yet.crude.and.tentative,.
table.45.
.
.
45.Kupferschmidt..Loc..Cit.
Afghanistan  ‘Warlords’  Poppies, heroin  Politicians, army, border 
control  
Regional  
Bulgaria  ‘Organised crime’  Opaquely-privatised  Key institutions: customs,  National  
 consisting of former and  
industries, trafficking  judiciary, media, etc.   
 current state security  ±(of women), taxes    
 agents     
Burma  Army  Drugs, industries  The state  National  
  controlled by army    
Colombia  Drug cartels,  Drugs  Legislature, political  Local control, with FARC  
 guerrillas (ELN,   parties, judiciary, police,  increasingly pushed into  
 FARC), Paramilitary Organisations   
border  remote areas  
Guatemala  Elements of the Army and  Cocaine  Institutions that might  National  
 former secret services   impinge on or facilitate trafficking   
Guinea-
Bissau  
Drug traffickers  Cocaine, foreign aid  Institutions that might 
impinge on or facilitate 
drug trafficking  
National  
High-conflict  Armies (domestic and  Natural resources, foreign   Regional  
countries in  foreign), ‘rebel groups’  aid    
Sub-Saharan  (domestic and foreign),     
Africa  foreign corporations 
exploiting natural     
 resources     
Italy  ‘Organised crime’ groups  Drugs, extortion,  Political, judicial, some  Regional control and  
 originating in southern  counterfeit merchandise,  
media, police  penetration of national  
 Italy  state contracts   institutions  
Kosovo  Organised crime with  Trafficking (weapons,  Institutions that might  National  
 the participation of some  
women, heroin)  impinge on or facilitate   
 KLA members   trafficking   Pakistan  Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI)  
Heroin, guns, the state  All institutions  National  
Peru  Vladimiro Lenin  Cocaine, weapons,  Tax authority, judiciary,  National  
1990–2000  Montesinos, Head of  embezzlement,  military, military   
 Peru’s Intelligence Service  
procurement
30  
intelligence, media   
Russia and  ‘Oligarchs’ colluding with  Opaquely-privatised  Most economic, political,  Regional and  
FSU  high state officials, 
many  
industries and natural  judicial and security  international, but in  
 of whom came from the  resources (oil, gas), state  
organs, including political  flux as state seeks to  
 security services  contracts, taxes  parties and media  subordinate or expropriate  
    some oligarchs  
United States  Corporations  Legal profits  Agencies regulating 
relevant industry  
None  
 
Country/ 
region  
Alleged agent(s) of 
state capture  
Primacy source(s) of 
illicit political finance  
Primary institutional 
targets  
Territorial expression 
of state capture  
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2. Strategy For Combating Corruption
The.standard.advice.for.combating.corruption.has.traditionally.focused.
on. measures. to. address. administrative. corruption. by. reforming. public.administration and public finance management. But with the increasing 
recognition.that.the.roots.of.corruption.extend.far.beyond.weaknesses.in.the.
capacity.of.government,.the.repertoire.has.been.gradually.expanding.to.target.
broader. structural. relationships,. including. the. internal. organisation. of. the.
political. system,. relationships. among. core. state. institutions,. the. interactions.between the state and firms, and the relationship between the state and civil 
society.46.
Increasing political accountability:
As. political. accountability. increases,. the. costs. to. politicians. of.making.decisions that benefit their private interests at the expense of the broader public 
interest. also. increase..Two.of. the.key. instruments. for. strengthening.political.
accountability.are:.(i).increasing.the.transparency.of.decisions.made.by.public.officials and ȋiiȌ increasing competition. through. organisations. that. provide.
broad. constituencies. with. vehicles,. such. as. mass-based. political. parties,. for.
expressing.their.collective.demands.
 Strengthening institutional restraints within the state:
The.institutional.design.of.the.state.can.be.an.important.mechanism.in.checking corruption,  particularly, the efective separation of powers among 
state.entities.with.each.operating.as.a.check.on.the.abuse.of.power.by.the.others..
Strengthening.and.raising.the.credibility.of.the.judicial.system.by.enhancing.the.
independence.and.accountability.of.judges.and.matching.functions.with.budget.
and.capacity.are.particularly.important.
46 The World Bank ȋʹͲͲͲȌ. Anticorruption in Transition A Contribution to the Policy Debate from 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf
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Strengthening civil society participation:
As. stakeholders. in. the. quality. of. governance. and. as. intermediaries.
for. communication. between. the. populace. and. the. institutions. of. state,. the.
organisations. that. comprise. civil. society. can. be. essential. in. constraining.
corruption..Recently,.there.has.been.an.emergence.of.greater.civil.society.activism.
regarding. corruption. throughout. the. region,. focused. especially. on:. creating.
public.awareness.about.corruption.and.the.need.to.control.it,.formulating.action.plans to fight corruption, and monitoring government behaviour. 
Fostering an independent media:
Free.and.open.media.help. check. the. level. of. corruption.by.uncovering.
and.shedding.light.on.abuses..Yet.the.promise.of.a.free.press.has.not.yet.been.
fully.realised.in.many.transition.countries..A.policy.of.openness,.formalised.in.
laws.guaranteeing. free. access. to. information,. strengthens. tools. for. oversight.
and.enlists.the.media.as.an.ally.in.controlling.corruption.
Creating a competitive private sector:
A.state.is.most.vulnerable.to.capture.when.economic.power.is.concentrated.in a few firms or industries and when competing economic interests lack viable 
access.to.the.policymaking.process..The.ability.of.powerful.economic.interests.to capture the state can be checked by reducing the benefits to these firms from 
capture..This.can.be.achieved.in.part.by.deepening.price.and.trade.liberalisation,.increasing transparency in the ownership structure and operations of firms, and 
introducing.greater.competition.in.concentrated.sectors.by.lowering.barriers.to.
entry.and.requiring.competitive.restructuring..
Reforming public sector management:While strengthening mechanisms of external accountability is important, 
it. is.also.essential.to.strengthen.the.internal.management.of.public.resources.
and.administration.to.reduce.opportunities.and.incentives.for.corruption..This.
requires.instilling.meritocracy.and.adequate.pay.in.public.administration.
In.combating.corruption.an.anti-corruption.strategy.is.needed:
Credible political leadership: 
A.serious.anticorruption.program.cannot.be. imposed.from.the.outside,.
but.requires.committed.leadership.from.within,.ideally.from.the.highest.levels.
of.the.state..
Diagnosing the nature and extent of the problem in each case: 
Implementing. surveys,. running.workshops,. and. developing. a. dialogue.
with.institutions.of.civil.society.on.corruption.are.all.critical.for.gaining.country-specific knowledge beyond the narrow limits of the typology. 
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Assessing the environment: The relevance and feasibility of specific reform instruments is closely 
linked. to. the.way. in.which.power. is.exercised,. the. level.of. informality. in. the.
society,.and.the.extent.to.which.people.feel.trust.in.their.institutions.and.in.each.
other..
Finding appropriate entry points: 
It.is.critical.to.begin.at.a.point.where.the.goals.are.feasible.and.tangible.
results. can. be. realised. within. a. time. frame. that. builds. support. for. further.
reforms.
Maximising leverage: Eforts should be made to design ǲwin-winǳ anticorruption strategies that 
promote.the.interests.and.reputations.of.major.politicians.and.businesspeople.
while. delivering. positive. externalities. such. as. enhancing. economic. growth,.
strengthening.governance,.or.reducing.poverty.and.inequality..
Based.on.some.researches.by.the.European.Bank.for.Reconstruction.and.
Development.(EBRD)..there.is.no.close.correlation.between.changes.in.levels.of capture and the introduction of high-profile anti-corruption programmes. 
The.same.can.be.said.for.administrative.corruption..However,..anti-corruption.
programmes.may.take.a.while.to.have.an.impact.and..time.series.and.overall.
number.of.observations.in.the.transition.region.can.be..too.limited.to.reach.any.firm conclusion.47.While the paradigm presented by (ellman and Kaufmann---of the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence 
the. formation.of. laws,. regulations,.decrees,.and.other.government.policies. to.
their. own. advantage. as. a. result. of. the. illicit. and. non-transparent. provision.of private benefits to public officials---certainly has validity in defining the 
behaviour.of.political/economic.actors.in.many.countries.of.the.world,.it.does.require a degree of refinement if it is to be applied to the entire Former Soviet 
Union.(FSU).region.While there exists rampant corruption in the countries of the FSU and 
oligarchs. in.many. countries. have. seized. the. lion’s. shares. of. State. assets,. the.
question.arises.as.to.who.is.capturing.who..Is.it.a.case.of.the.State.being.captured.
by. the. private. sector. or. a. fusion. of. the. State. and. the. private. sector?. Putin.already put it in quite a definite statement, ǲI only want to draw your attention
straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large 
extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control. So 
perhaps what one should do least of all is blame the mirror.”48.
For.Indonesia,.the.data.released.by.TII.is.very.intriguing:49..
Decrease in state support to political parties
In.75.per.cent.of.all.liberal.democracies.in.the.world,.the.state.provides.financial assistance to political parties, with no significant diferences between 
47.Bowser..Loc..Cit.
48 Vladimir Putin, in a meeting with Russiaǯs business leaders in July ʹͲͲͲ ȋ(ofman, ʹͲͲͲȌ. from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm
49.TII..Loc..Cit.
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old.and.new.democracies..India,.Switzerland,.New.Zealand.and.the.United.States.
are.the.only.liberal.democracies.which.do.not.allocate.public.funds.for.political.
parties..However,.even.in.some.of.these.countries,.state.support.is.available.for.
individual.candidates.
Increasing electoral costsBefore ʹͲͲͶ, political parties had to finance only one parliamentary campaign every five years, with executive officials elected afterwards by their 
respective. legislatures..After. the.post-2004. reforms,.which. introduced.direct.
elections. for. the. presidency,. governorships,. and. district. head. positions,. the.number of popular ballots in any one district in a five-year cycle rose to a 
minimum.of.four.and.a.maximum.of.seven.
Impact on state budgets: development of ‘indirect state subsidies
Following.the.implementation.of.the.regulation.in.2005,.the.share.of.per.
diems.and.other.allowances.in.public.budgets.skyrocketed,.with.an.increase.of.
more.than.80per.cent.for.Parliament.Members..
Surge in political corruption
150.gents.and.mayors.and.17.governors.have.been.jailed.since.2005.
Capture of political parties’ leadership by wealthy candidates : disruption of 
leadership and weakening of political lines of demarcations)n the ʹͲͲͷ local elections, party affiliation has played only a very 
marginal. role. in. the. nomination. process.. Although. parties. had. the. exclusive.
right.to.nominate.candidates,.with.independents.barred.from.running,.only.22.per cent of all nominees were party officials. The large majority was bureaucrats 
and.entrepreneurs,.with.36.and.28.per.cent.representation,.respectively;.39.8.
per.cent.of.all.members.of.the.2004-2009.national.parliaments.were.business-
people.
Conclusion
Power.corrupts..absolutely..To.address.Lord.Acton.(1952).after.a.century.seems fit to this matter. ǲ)t is easier to find people fit to govern themselves than 
people to govern others. Every man is the best, the most responsible, judge of his 
own advantage.”50..)llicit aspects of governance may appear difficult to assess, as they are by 
nature.clandestine..However,.this.dark.side.of.public.life.is.not.unknowable,.and.
various.scholars,.particularly.economists,. are.making. inroads. into.describing.and measuring these phenomena. The World Bank and others are currently 
attempting. to. analyse. the. conditions. and. processes. by. which. state. capture.
occurs,.and.to.measure.its.extent.Kaufmann whowas the first  to research about state capture already 
explained. that. in. some. developing. countries. such. as. Indonesiathis. type. of.corruption may not be referred to as state capture. Nonetheless the significant 
parties. in. the.country. that.are. involved. in. these.matters.already.address. the.
50.Lord.Acton,.as.quoted.by.Himmelfarb.in.her.work,.Lord.Acton,.1952.(University.of.Chicago.Press,.
1960).pp.172-3...from.http://blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Acton.htm
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issue. )ndonesia Corruption Watch ȋ)CWȌ and Transparency )nternational 
Indonesia.(TII).are.some.of.them..)n analysing  political financing regulations, T)) addresses that such 
practices.could.actually.be.prevented.to.a.larger.extent.if.political.parties.were.required to provide standardised financial reports in facilitating the audit of public accountants. This can go in three ways, as follows: first, by amending 
the. law.on.general. elections. to. challenge. the.Constitutional.Court’s.decision;.
second,.by.limiting.the.donations.of.party.members;.and.last,.by.revising.the.law.
on.political.parties.to.generalise.reporting.obligations.in.terms.of.corporate.and.
individual.donations.outside.the.campaign.period.
This.writing. is.merely. a. contribution. to. the. research. at. large.. . Due. to.
the.global. form.of.corruption,.every.means. is.necessary..Hopefully,. this.piece.
can.shed.some. light. into. the.growing.policy.dialogue.on.developing.practical.
strategies. for. reducing. corruption.. As. more. and. more. countries. seek. to.
implement.anticorruption.programs,. it. is. critical. for. the.other. institutions. to.
continue.to.enhance.this.dialogue.with.both.the.lessons.of.experience.and.the.
new.approaches.designed.to.tackle.the.roots.of.corruption.
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